[00:00:00] Speaker 1: Now that the deposed Venezuelan president, Nicolas Maduro, is facing four federal charges, what is the likelihood that they will actually hold up in court? Maduro, who has been charged with narco-terrorism conspiracy, conspiring to import cocaine, and possessing and conspiring to possess machine guns and destructive devices, is expected in court as soon as tomorrow. Let's bring in CNN's senior legal analyst, Eli Honig, a former prosecutor in the Southern District of New York. Eli, thanks for being here this morning. So is it illegal? Is this legal? That's the question that so many people have right now about the way that this was carried out, the way that they arrested Maduro and his wife, brought him to the United States. Was this a legal operation?

[00:00:42] Speaker 2: Well, Manu, as we sit here on Sunday, January 4th, there is no way that I nor anyone else can give you a definitive answer to that question. That's part of what makes this case so remarkable, so unusual. But the good news is we will find out, because I assure you that once Maduro gets lawyers, one of the first things they will do is challenge his arrest. They will argue that the manner of his extraction from Venezuela violated international law. They will argue that he has something called sovereign immunity, meaning he can't be criminally charged for his actions as the leader of another country. We will get rulings on those issues from the court. I suspect that these charges will hold up, and here's why. There is a longstanding, first of all, opinion out of the Justice Department. It dates back to 1989. It actually was authored by Bill Barr, who would go on to become the attorney general twice. But that opinion basically says even if an arrest violates some of the principles or tenets of international law, it doesn't mean that the case gets dismissed. It doesn't mean the case cannot be tried in the United States. And looking at this purely from a practical point of view, Manu, and I know this judge who has the case, Judge Hellerstein, I appeared in front of him many different times. I just don't see a federal United States district court judge saying, this arrest was improper. Case dismissed. Nicolas Maduro, you are allowed to go free, just looking at it from a purely practical standpoint.

[00:02:04] Speaker 1: Senator Mike Lee said the action likely falls within the president's inherent authority under Article II of the Constitution to protect U.S. personnel from an actual or imminent attack. Does that hold water?

[00:02:17] Speaker 2: Well, so that's precisely what underpins that 1989 DOJ memo that I talked about, that basically says this is not an area for the courts to intervene in. The decision about how to handle foreign affairs, diplomacy, military actions sits with the executive branch, sits with the Article II president, and it's really not something for the judiciary to interfere with. I do think that will fundamentally drive the decision in this case.

[00:02:42] Speaker 1: So the vice president, J.D. Vance, pushed back against those calling it illegal, saying he had multiple indictments, Maduro had multiple indictments, and Vance went on to say, quote, you don't get to avoid justice for drug trafficking in the United States because you live in a palace in Caracas. Are there broader implications, Eli, for that argument if the courts allow this to go forward?

[00:03:09] Speaker 2: Yeah, I think there are. I think that's a bit oversimplified from the vice president. I mean, if it was as simple as if the leader of a foreign nation commits some act that happens to violate U.S. law, we can go pick that person off and take them out of the palace and bring them into the United States. I'm not saying we should never do that, but I don't think it's quite as straightforward as you commit a crime against us, we can take you out whenever we want. We can bring you here for criminal prosecution. I think there's a complex set of legal and political and constitutional factors here. And I think the charges against Maduro, if you look at them, it's more than just drug trafficking. It's a 20-plus year stretch of narco-terrorism. I think a lot of the answers to these questions that you're raising, Manyu, really have to come from the political branch and have to come from Congress more than from the courts. Remember, when this case is being tried in the Southern District of New York, the questions are really quite narrow. I think a judge is likely to uphold this case, and ultimately, Manyu, it'll be handled as any other criminal trial. It'll ultimately go to a jury of 12 Manhattanites, 12 New Yorkers, and they will decide Nicolas Maduro's fate.

[00:04:14] Speaker 1: Ali, is this case a strong one against Maduro, or do you think there are holes when you look at the indictment?

[00:04:20] Speaker 2: So I've read the indictment carefully. It appears to be strong. The conduct itself is overwhelming. We are talking about a two decades plus long system that would basically use the government of Venezuela to unite all these different narco-terrorist groups, the FARC and others, and Maduro allegedly sent 250-plus tons of cocaine into the United States each and every year. He engaged in money laundering. He used diplomatic passports to get safe passage for drug traffickers, used violence, weaponry, bombs. The question, really, in any case like this, Manyu, where you have a hierarchical organization can you get that evidence on the top guy? Because typically the top guy, whether it's the president of a country or the leader of a terrorist group, they're insulated. They have other people do their dirty work for them. They limit who they talk to and what they say. So that's going to be the challenge for prosecutors here.

[00:05:17] Speaker 1: And very quickly, how long do you think this will take to play out, and how much prison time could Maduro be facing?

[00:05:24] Speaker 2: So he's looking at a minimum of 30 years in prison, a max of life if he's convicted. Typically a case like this, Manyu, in federal court could take anywhere from a year to two years to reach trial. We're going to have some complicated pretrial motions, as you and I discussed. So I think a trial is likely maybe at the earliest, late 2026, more likely sometime in 2027.

[00:05:44] Speaker 1: Oh boy. Yeah. I guess we'll be talking about this for a while. Elion, thank you so much. I'm ready. Absolutely. Thanks for being with us this morning. Really appreciate it. My panel is back with me. David, there's also some issues involving United Nations as well. Right.

[00:05:57] Speaker 3: There's an international law element to this. I mean, I think Ellie's analysis here is just right. I'd be shocked if the judge paid attention to how it is that Maduro ended up in this courtroom. Right. But the United States has signed, as a treaty, the UN Charter. The UN Charter says you cannot use force on a sovereign territory of another country without its consent. Well, clearly that wasn't here. Without the authorization of the UN Security Council, well, they didn't even get authorization from Congress. Right. Or because of a self-defense argument. And that's the argument that the administration's going to make, that the combination of drugs and other elements of this made this an operation for self-defense. The big question, Manu, is if you're a foreign leader, maybe you're Vladimir Putin. Maybe you're Xi Jinping. And you look at this and you say, well, this one isn't bad. Right. The Russians in the early days of the Ukraine war tried to grab Zelensky. I'm sure that the Chinese have thought about what they could do with the leader of Taiwan. Right. So you're creating a precedent here you may not want to live with. Yeah.

[00:07:09] Speaker 1: That's such a good point. And I just want to just take a step back about what it says about Trump's foreign policy doctrine. We mentioned the Donro. Trump called it the Donro doctrine, referring to, of course, the Monroe doctrine of the U.S. foreign policy from the 1820s. This is just what Trump has done. He's authorized the actions this year in 2025. Strikes against Somalia, Iraq, Yemen, Iran, Venezuela, Syria, Nigeria. I mean, that's a fair amount from a president who suggested he be a peace president. They'll say peace through strength, but what do you think this says about Trump's foreign policy?

[00:07:44] Speaker 4: Well, it's not isolationism. It's not America first, I think, in the way that most people had interpreted it in his first term and were interpreting it as he was campaigning. I think that this president, along with this cabinet, folks like Marco Rubio and Pete Hegseth, have decided that America is going to be involved and be heavily involved and have its hands in a number of different conflicts. And that is going to be a challenge, especially in the midterm year when I was hearing from his officials that he was really going to turn back inwards. And it also, to David's point, sends quite a message globally that the era of people kind of minding their own business is over. The United States is doing this. Who else might it embolden?

[00:08:32] Speaker 1: And what's next? I mean, Greenland? This is what Katie Miller, Stephen Miller's wife, she's a podcaster. She posted this, Greenland, soon with the American flag on it.

[00:08:42] Speaker 5: Yeah. And I did see Denmark officials respond to that tweet, saying it's a friendly reminder that we are shared, we have shared interests that we otherwise get along, which is kind of a notable place to be in right now. But back to Dasha's point, I think it's really interesting, too, how both Secretary Rubio and Vice President Vance tried to kind of, you know, reconcile the whole, you know, peace president with what happened, and both emphasized that Maduro had multiple warnings and multiple offers to resolve this in a different way from the United States. And Rubio kind of made that point, saying, we tried to resolve this peacefully. We understand that this president is the peace president, but it is a contradiction that they are going to have to really explain and confront in the coming months. Yeah.

[00:09:31] Speaker 1: And they haven't really explained a whole lot, as we discussed earlier, much more ahead, of course.